2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the SDG’s adoption and the 80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the international community adopted the UN Charter (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) to provide the vision and guiding principles for maintaining peace, security, and effective global cooperation. In September 2024, at the UN Summit of the Future, the UN member states reaffirmed their commitment to the SDGs and effective multilateralism, adopting by consensus the Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations.

The Pact calls for 56 actions related to SDG implementation, peace, and collective security, including the transformation of the multilateral system and reform of the international financial architecture (United Nations 2024):

• We will take bold, ambitious, accelerated, just and transformative actions to implement the 2030 Agenda, achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and leave no one behind. (Action 1)

• We will redouble our efforts to build and sustain peaceful, inclusive and just societies and address the root causes of conflicts. (Action 13)

• We will transform global governance and reinvigorate the multilateral system to tackle the challenges, and seize the opportunities, of today and tomorrow. (Action 38)

• We will accelerate reform of the international financial architecture to address the challenges of today and tomorrow. (Action 47)

This chapter aims to gauge countries’ support for the SDGs and UN-based multilateralism. Unlike the SDG Index (Part 2), which addresses SDG outcomes or implementation, this chapter focuses on intentions to promote global cooperation for sustainable development – via, for instance, regular SDG reviews and action plans and the ratification of major UN treaties. Intentions matter for at least two reasons. First, they help build the trust needed among nation-states for effective multilateralism. Second, because at the global level, outcome-based data can be missing or outdated, and significant changes in many cases may take years to materialize, despite the adoption of ambitious policies. Consequentially, outcome statistics may not reflect the current policy landscape or commitments to advancing the SDGs and effective multilateralism. This chapter therefore serves as a complement to the SDG Index by examining countries’ efforts and intentions to contribute to a collective movement toward sustainable development and international cooperation as emphasisd under SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals).

We begin by providing an overview of countries’ efforts and commitments towards the SDGs, notably through the preparation of Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) and Voluntary Local Reviews (VLRs), where central/ federal governments or regional and local authorities present their SDG action plans and evaluate their progress. We then present an updated and expanded version of the Index of countries’ support for UN-based multilateralism (UN-Mi), including aggregate results as well as detailed results by indicator. The UN-Mi benefited from several rounds of comments collected since 2022 on pilot versions and in working papers (Sachs, Lafortune, and Drumm 2023). Its detailed methodology was peer-reviewed in 2024 (Lafortune and Sachs 2024). For clarity, most charts in this chapter focus on G20 and large countries (which collectively account for almost three-quarters of the world population). We also include the global median in each chart, as a measure of central tendency across the 193 UN member states, as the median is less affected by outliers than the average. Detailed data for all countries is accessible at: https://sdgtransformationcenter.org/.

In 2015, through the 2030 Agenda resolution, all 193 UN member states committed to preparing regular reviews and action plans for sustainable development, pledging to engage in a “systematic follow-up and review of implementation of this Agenda over the next fifteen years” (United Nations 2015). The resolution specifies that these reviews should be “voluntary and country-led”. Since 2016, more than 400 Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) have been presented. As of July, 2025, 190 UN member states have taken part in the VNR process, with the majority (149) presenting two or more VNRs (Figure 3.1 and 3.2).¹ Only three member states have never participated in the VNR process: Haiti, Myanmar, and the United States. The State of Palestine and the European Union are examples of non-UN member states that have also prepared and presented VNRs.

Note: n=193. Includes countries that are listed as 2025 VNR presenters in the letter signed by the President of the ECOSOC on 7 October 2024.

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on https://hlpf.un.org/vnrs

Note: Includes countries that are listed as 2025 VNR presenters in the letter signed by the President of the ECOSOC on 7 October 2024.

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on https://hlpf.un.org/vnrs

Other metrics can provide a broader picture of societal support for sustainable development and global cooperation. At the subnational level, regional and local governments have prepared Voluntary Local Reviews (VLRs). While these hold no official status, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) tracks the publication of VLRs globally. New York City was among the first cities in the world to present a VLR, and as of April 2025, DESA has listed 249 VLRs, published by regional and local authorities in 43 countries. Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Finland, Mexico, Spain, and the United States have each published 10 or more (Figure 3.3).

Note: As of 1 April 2025.

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). https://sdgs.un.org/topics/voluntary-local-reviews

Interestingly, despite current geopolitical tensions, survey data collected by UNDP reveals that an overwhelming majority of people globally (86 percent) believe that countries “should work together on climate change even if they disagree on other issues, such as trade or security” (UNDP 2024).

Source: Authors

The UN-Mi tracks countries’ support for UN-based multilateralism. It does not capture efforts made by countries to promote international cooperation in regional and bilateral fora, or within the BRICS, G20, G7, OECD and other groups. The index measures a specific aspect of multilateralism distinct both conceptually and statistically from other concepts and constructs, including the Good Country Index or the Lowy Institute’s Global Diplomacy Index (which assesses the scale of diplomatic networks).

We use a narrowly defined set of six headline indicators to gauge countries’ commitment to UN-based multilateralism: countries’ commitment for UN-based multilateralism:

1. Ratification of major UN treaties

2. Percentage of votes aligned with the international majority at the UN General Assembly (UNGA)

3. Participation in selected UN organizations and agencies

4. Participation in conflicts and militarization

5. Use of unilateral coercive measures (UCMs)

6. Contribution to the UN budget and international solidarity

The median UN-Mi score is 66 (out of 100), but there are large disparities across UN member states. The 2025 Index is topped again by Barbados, followed by five Small Island Developing States (SIDS), which tend to adhere to UN principles and treaties and not contribute much to militarizing the world. Non-SIDS countries such as Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, Malaysia, Mongolia, Namibia, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, Tunisia, and Uruguay also rank in the top 20 globally, each scoring 80 or above. Conversely, the United States ranks as the country least committed to UN-based multilateralism, with a score of 5. Other countries that rank poorly on this year’s UN-Mi include Israel, Somalia, South Sudan, the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic Republic of Korea, all with scores below 45. Among G20 countries, Brazil stands out as the most committed to UN-based multilateralism, followed by Mexico, Argentina, South Africa, Germany, Indonesia, and Japan – all scoring above the global median of 66. By contrast, G20 countries the Russian Federation, Türkiye, and the United States all have UN-Mi scores below 50.

The first indicator is “Percentage of major UN treaties ratified”. This indicator covers 60 international conventions and agreements adopted by the United Nations from 1946–2024, or adopted before 1946 and later added to the UN treaty system. It covers UN instruments ratified by more than 50 percent of the international community, excluding protocols, optional protocols, amendments, and conventions that were later terminated or applied only to a small number of countries. Treaties adopted outside of the United Nations or deposited by parties other than the UN Secretary General, such as the Geneva Conventions (adopted under the ICRC), were excluded. We recorded in our database (accessible online) whether member states have signed or ratified each one. Signature of a treaty is not legally binding, however ratification (or acceptance, accession, definitive signature, and succession) is.

The global median is 85 percent (maximum 98 percent, minimum 40 percent). Among G20 and large countries, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom have all ratified more than 90 percent of major UN treaties (Figure 3.5). By contrast, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia have ratified less than 75 percent and the United States less than 60 percent. In 2025, the United States withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement.

Note: reaties ratified by more than 50 percent of UN member states (N=60). As of January 1, 2025. Global median (85 percent) corresponds to the median percentage of major UN treaties ratified across all 193 UN member states.

Source: Authors’ calculations based on UN treaty database.

The second indicator is “Percentage of votes aligned with the international majority at the UN General Assembly”. Chapter IV of the UN Charter describes the role and function of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the main decision-making body of the United Nations. This indicator measures the percentage of times that each member state has voted with the simple international majority (not weighted by population), out of a total of 458 recorded votes over the period 2020–2024. Overall, since 1945, votes on more than 5,000 UNGA resolutions have been reported in the UN digital library (data were obtained via python web scraping). For each resolution, UN member states can vote yes or no, abstain, or be absent. In the vast majority of cases (98 percent of the time) the majority vote is “Yes”.

The global median for alignment with the majority vote is 76 percent (ranging from a maximum of 96 percent to a minimum of 26 percent). Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Egypt (Arab Republic), Ethiopia, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa aligned with the majority vote 80 percent of the time (Figure 3.6). Australia, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Korea (Republic of), the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom aligned with the international majority vote between 50 and 60 percent of the time. The United States, however, aligned with the international majority vote around 30 percent of the time. Of all 193 UN member states, only Israel recorded a lower percentage of alignment (26 percent) over this period.

Note: Simple majority (not population weighted). Votes recorded between 2020 and 2024 (N=458). Global median (76%).

Source: Authors’ calculations, based on UN Digital Library voting data.

The share of votes aligned with the international majority has varied significantly over time (Figure 3.7). In the early days of the UN, in the 1950s, the United States aligned with the majority vote of the international community 80 percent of the time. However, this gradually fell to 30 percent or less from the late 1980s through the 2020s (Lafortune and Sachs 2025). Votes that put the United States in the minority are often related to Israel’s continued occupation of Palestinian territories captured in the 1967 war, or to collective security arrangements and international economic and financial reforms (including the end of unilateral coercive measures). By contrast, Brazil, a major economy, consistently voted alongside the rest of the international majority three-quarters of the time or more throughout the entire period.

Source: Authors, building on Lafortune and Sachs (2024).

The third indicator refers to “Membership and participation in selected United Nations organizations”. Chapter IX of the UN Charter describes the role of specialized agencies,² in fostering international economic and social cooperation. This indicator captures membership in 24 UN organizations as of March 2025: all 15 specialized agencies,2 the 6 funds and programmes (UNDP, UNEP, UNFPA, UN-HABITAT, UNICEF and WFP), the Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These 24 were selected to include all of the specialized agencies and represent a broad range of issues related to sustainable development (education, health, finance, trade, telecommunication, and industrial policies).

Most of the 193 UN member states participate in all 24 selected organizations (with a global median of 24, a maximum of 24, and a minimum of 12). Since the last UN-Mi edition, Comoros has become the 165th WTO member state, while South Sudan and the Solomon Islands have joined UNIDO as its 172nd and 173rd member states, respectively. The majority of G20 and large countries are members of all 24 organizations (Figure 3.8), however Argentina announced in February 2025 that it would leave the WHO; Australia is not a member of UNIDO, UNWTO or IFAD; Canada and the United Kingdom are not members of UNIDO or UNWTO; France left UNIDO in 2014; Ethiopia is not a member of WTO, the Russian Federation is not a member of UNWTO; and the United States is not a member of UNIDO or UNWTO, and withdrew from the WHO in February 2025.

Note: Global median and maximum = 24. As of March 2025.

Source: Authors, data compiled via desk research on individual organizations and agencies’ web portals.

The fourth indicator concerns “Participation in conflicts and militarization”. The Preamble of the 1945 UN Charter states that all UN member states must “practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors” and “unite [their] strength to maintain international peace and security”. Several UN resolutions and reports highlight the link between disarmament and development. The final document of the tenth special session on disarmament, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1978, underlined the following:

“There is also a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter. Therefore resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.” (UN 1978, par 35)

Almost ten years later, in 1987, the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development led to the adoption of an action plan that included commitments to reduce military spending and redirect the resources saved toward development (United Nations 1987). More recently, in the context of the SDGs, the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs stated the following:

“Through its 17 Sustainable Development Goals, the Agenda sets out a road map to end hunger, protect the planet, achieve gender equality, improve health and more. … It is estimated that the cost to achieve quality universal primary and early secondary education for all (Goal 4) would barely exceed 3 per cent of global annual military spending, while eliminating extreme poverty and hunger (Goals 1 and 2) would amount to only about 13 per cent of annual military spending. Reinvesting 5 per cent of global military spending would also exceed the initial annual costs of adapting to climate change in developing countries (Goal 13). So little could do so much.” (UNODA 2020)

In 2024, through the adoption of the Pact for the Future, UN member states raised their concerns about the potential impact that the global increase in military spending could have on sustainable development (Action 13). They requested the Secretary-General establish, by the end of the current (79th) session, an analysis of the impact specifically on the achievement of the SDGs. According to data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the world’s military expenditure reached 2,718 billion USD in 2024, marking a 9.4 percent increase in real terms compared to 2023. This represents the largest year-on-year rise since at least the end of the Cold War (SIPRI 2025). Notably, military spending increased in all world regions.

Our “Participation in conflicts and militarization” indicator relies on data from the 2024 Global Peace Index (GPI), compiled by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP 2024). It is calculated as the average of a country’s score on the GPI’s “Militarisation” domain and on the two external dimensions of the “Ongoing Conflict” domain: “relations with neighboring countries” and external conflicts (number and resulting mortality). The Militarization pillar includes comparable data on military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, the number of armed service officers per capita, and financial contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Among G20 and large countries, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico and the Philippines perform best on this indicator (scoring below the global median). By contrast, the Russian Federation performs the worst globally (Figure 3.9).

Note: from 1 (best, less militarized) to (5, worst, more militarized). Global median (1.86)

Source: Authors’ calculations based on IEP, 2024.

The fifth indicator relates to the “Use of unilateral coercive measures (UCMs)”. This indicator examines the adoption by UN member states of unilateral sanctions against other countries. Several UN resolutions stress that unilateral coercive measures and practices “are contrary to international law, international humanitarian law, the UN Charter and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States” (OHCHR 2024). They also underline that. in the long term, such measures may lead to social problems and raise humanitarian concerns in the targeted states. In 2014, the Human Rights Council created the mandate of the “Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights”. The 2030 Agenda stipulates that:

“States are strongly urged to refrain from promulgating and applying any unilateral economic, financial or trade measures not in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations that impede the full achievement of economic and social development, particularly in developing countries.” (United Nations 2025, para 30)

Since 1968, however, the UN Security Council has established 31 sanctions regimes, including the famous 1977 sanctions against apartheid South Africa, (unanimously imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 418). The Council has imposed sanctions regimes concerning the following states: Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South Africa, the former Yugoslavia (2), Haiti (2), Angola, Liberia (3), Eritrea/Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Iran, Somalia/Eritrea, Iraq (2), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Lebanon, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Libya (2), Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Yemen, South Sudan, and Mali. Sanctions regimes have also been established concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and the Taliban.

The data on UCMs presented in this report are sourced from the Global Sanctions Database (V4, 2024), which provides information on sanctions imposed against countries, including the beginning and final year of sanction imposition (Felbermayr et al. 2020; Drexel University, HTWG Konstanz, and WIFO 2024). Here we present sanctions adopted unilaterally from 1950 to 2021 that remained in place as of 2022 or later. For our purposes, a sanction is classified as unilateral if it has not been authorized by the UN Security Council, even when imposed by multiple countries. Sanction regimes adopted unilaterally by regional organizations, such as the EU or the League of Arab States, have been attributed to their individual member states.

Only a small number of countries make frequent use of UCMs as a policy tool (global median number of uses of UCMs, 1950–2022/23 = 2). The United States is by far the most significant user of UCMs, particularly since the late 1980s and early 1990s, followed by European countries (Figure 3.10).

Note: UCMs adopted between 1950 and 2021 that continued into 2022/23. Global median (2)

Source: Authors, based on Drexel Global Sanctions Database

Finally, the sixth indicator relates to each country’s “Contribution to the UN budget and international solidarity”. Articles 17 and 19 of the UN Charter cover the organization’s financial and budgetary arrangements, with the UN Fifth Committee reporting on administrative and budgetary matters. The capacity to pay remains the core principle for determining each member state’s contribution to the United Nations’ regular and peacekeeping budgets. Based on this principle, the United Nations establishes a scale of assessments to apportion expenses for its regular budget and for peacekeeping operations. For the period 2025–2027, the United States and China are the largest contributors, each accounting for more than 20 percent of the regular UN budget and peacekeeping operations.

The UN Fifth Committee keeps a record of countries that pay their dues on time, those with delays, and those in extreme arrears. Countries in significant arrears are subject to the provisions of Article 19: “a Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years.”

Since contributions to the UN budget are determined by the principle of capacity to pay, we do not rate countries on the total amount they pay. However, no matter the level of their contribution, every country can be expected to pay their dues on time, to ensure the effective functioning of the UN system. This indicator focuses on delays in payment of UN dues over the period, 2020–2024 inclusive. A member state receives a perfect score (100) for each year they appear on the UNGA Committee on Contributions’ “honor roll“ list I paid on time. Members appearing on list II, indicating that dues were paid after the 30-day due period, are given a score of 66 small delay in payment. Those absent from the honor roll page are given a score of 33 large delay in payment. A score of 0 is given to countries in arrears in the payment of their financial contributions, under the terms of Article 19, in January of the subsequent year, according to the list published on the UN General Assembly dedicated Article 19 page extreme arrears in payment. Final scores correspond to each country’s average across 2020–2024.

From 2020 to 2024, 21 countries systematically paid their dues to the UN on time, within the 30-day due period.³ Some countries, however, such as Comoros, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Venezuela have appeared on the Article 19 list several times. As largely documented, delays in payment by some of the largest contributors to the regular UN regular budget and peacekeeping operations in recent years represents a significant operational challenge for the effective functioning of the UN system (The Economist 2025) (Figure 3.11).

Note: Score from 100 (systematically paid on time), 66 (small delays in payment), 33 (large delays in payment), 0 (subject to Article 19 due to extreme arrears in payment). Global median (66, small delays in payment). Score computed as the simple average across all years 2020–2024.

Source: Authors, based on UN Committee on Contributions.

For HICs with available data, total scores are adjusted based on their contribution to international solidarity, as measured by the percentage of their GNI that is devoted to official development assistance (ODA), averaged over the 2020–2024 period. Four OECD/DAC members achieved the 0.7 percent target (Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden). On average, according to the OECD (2025), international aid declined in 2024 by 7.1 percent in real terms compared to the previous year (Figure 3.12).

Note: From 1960–2017, ODA as a percentage of GNI, net disbursements; 2018–2024, ODA grant equivalent. The international target is 0.7 percent ODA/GNI.

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD, 2025

Ensuring peace and security, advancing solutions to address the climate and biodiversity crises, and managing the pitfalls of runaway technologies – such as advanced biotechnologies that could create new pathogens, or AI systems capable of generating fake news or provocations to war – cannot be resolved by one country alone. These challenges require collaboration among nation-states. In a context where humanity faces unprecedented threats of self-destruction (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 2025), nation-states, which remain at the heart of the multilateral system, must be held accountable for upholding the values and principles of the UN Charter and for advancing the SDGs – our shared global vision for sustainable development.

This chapter provides an overview of countries’ support for the SDGs and UN-based multilateralism. It underlines the overwhelming intention of most nation-states to support UN-based multilateralism, while also addressing how low and in some cases declining support among a small group of powerful and influential UN member states undermines the effective functioning of the UN system. All countries should capitalize on the momentum of upcoming international conferences and summits – including in 2025 the FfD4 in Spain, the 80th UN General Assembly, COP 30 in Brazil, and the UN World Social Summit, as well as in 2027 the next SDG Summit at Heads-of-State level – to recommit to strengthening UN-based multilateralism and global partnerships, as emphasisd by SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals), and accelerating actions to achieve the SDGs by 2030 and mid-century.

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