The SDGs require long-term directed change and global cooperation. Long-term investment plans are essential for national success in meeting the goals. There was no expectation in 2015, when the SDGs and Agenda 2030 were adopted, that all goals and targets would be achieved at their midpoint. However, by 2023, one would expect that most countries would have implemented ambitious policy, regulatory and investment frameworks compatible with achieving major SDG transformations. It could also be expected that all countries would have at least once documented their progress and their plans for achieving the SDGs in a Voluntary National Review (VNRs) presented at the United Nations.

This section discusses government commitment and efforts for the SDGs. It captures something different from the SDG Index. A country facing a large gap to conquer on the SDG Index may have introduced ambitious policy frameworks that are likely to lead to future SDG breakthroughs – especially if these policies and planned investments are supported by adequate financing. As such, this assessment of government commitment and efforts for the SDGs is more “forward-looking”. Compared with outcome statistics, however, input and process statistics are less internationally standardized and rely on more qualitative information and expert judgement.

Nation-states continue to hold the primary responsibility for achieving the SDGs. This section focuses primarily on the executive branch at the federal/national level, although we briefly discuss how regions and cities can also use the SDGs as a strategy and monitoring framework. Other SDSN reports discuss subnational SDG progress and challenges at length. Building on earlier work conducted by the SDSN (Sachs et al, 2018–2022; Lafortune et al, 2022), we conceptualize government efforts for the SDGs using a three-pillar framework: (1) political leadership and institutional coordination; (2) SDG integration in sectoral policies and long-term pathways; and (3) commitment to multilateralism under the UN Charter (see Figure 3.1). For each pillar, we present proxy indicators that build on a combination of qualitative survey tools, third-party data, and data scraped from online institutional resources. We include results for each pillar, which we aggregate into an overall score for “government efforts and commitments for the SDGs”. Building on close cooperation with SDSN national and regional networks and other partners, we cover this year 74 countries from various income groups and world regions.

A detailed database and additional technical information are available online. This remains largely a work in progress, and we welcome feedback and comments on the selected indicators and methodology (see more at www.sdgtransformationcenter.org).

The SDGs have a significant impact on public management practices and procedures (SDSN and OECD, 2019). Every year since 2018, SDSN has called on its global network of experts to track public statements by governments and their strategic use of public processes to support the SDGs. This information is collected through a survey of national coordination and implementation mechanisms at the central/federal level of government. The survey evaluates whether the SDGs are used and mentioned in official speeches, strategies, monitoring systems, budgets, and other public processes. It provides an overarching assessment of national/ federal government efforts to embrace the SDG agenda which is complemented by a more granular assessment of the alignment of sectoral policies, regulations, and investments for the SDGs (presented in the next sub-section).

This year’s survey covers 74 countries (14 more than in 2022) plus the European Union. It includes all G20 countries, most OECD members, most countries with a population greater than 100 million inhabitants, and several LICs, LMICs, UMICs, HICs, and SIDS. Overall, these 74 countries represent nearly 85 percent of the world’s population. Survey results are presented in Table 3.1. Data were collected and analyzed in close partnership with SDSN’s global network, and results have been shared with UN Permanent Missions for comment prior to publication.

Note: * DI = Domestic implementation; IC = International cooperation. Data from Jamaica, except questions about VNRs, are from the 2022 SDSN survey of government efforts. Spillovers in VNRs mean the use of terms “spillovers”, “international spillovers”, “transboundary effects” and “policy coherence” (in the context of trade or official development assistance). More details about questions and results are online at wwww.sdgindex.org and www.sdgtransformationcenter.org).

Source: SDSN 2023 Survey of Government Efforts for the SDGs (February 2023).

Note: * DI = Domestic implementation; IC = International cooperation. Responses for Ukraine reflect the situation as of February 2022. Spillovers in VNRs mean the use of terms “spillovers”, “international spillovers”, “transboundary effects” and “policy coherence” (in the context of trade or official development assistance). More details about questions and results are online at wwww.sdgindex.org and www.sdgtransformationcenter.org).

Source: SDSN 2023 Survey of Government Efforts for the SDGs (February 2023).

The key finding from this survey is that, seven years after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, most governments have signaled “soft” SDG integration into their public management practices and procedures – although there is significant variation across countries – yet “hard” SDG integration is generally missing, including the use of the SDGs to support long-term budget and investment frameworks. By July 2023, all UN Member States will have presented a VNR except for Haiti, Myanmar, South Sudan, the United States and Yemen.

Most VNRs identify SDG priorities and actions within country borders, but fail to accurately capture efforts to curb negative international spillovers and the potential transboundary impacts of their policies. In general, our findings echo other research published over the past twelve months, showing continued gaps in SDG leadership and institutionalization (Biermann et al, 2022; Kotzé et al, 2022; IGS, 2023). Further integration of goal-based sustainable development into public management processes, supported by long-term, science-based pathways, remains a top priority in most countries if they are to achieve SDG breakthroughs by 2030 and beyond.

Official high-level speeches and the preparation of VNRs (as the official government-led process to report on SDG progress, gaps, and policy efforts) provide relevant proxies to gauge political commitment to the SDGs. Between January 2022 and April 2023, 64 percent of the countries surveyed reinforced their commitment to the SDGs in an official speech or statement by the head of state (president or prime minister) – an increase from 2022, when only 57 percent of surveyed countries had done so – and since 2016, 188 UN Member States have prepared VNRs (see Figure 3.2). Forty countries have committed to submitting a VNR this year: two will be presenting a VNR for the first time, 37 for the second time, and one for the third time. Two countries – Togo and Uruguay – have submitted four VNRs since 2016. Two non-UN-members (the European Union and Palestine) have or will also submit VNRs. At the midpoint of the 2030 Agenda, only five countries have never submitted a VNR, among them the United States (HLPF, 2023).

Note: Data includes VNRs that will be submitted by countries in 2023.

Source: Authors’ analysis. Based on data from the United Nations (2023).

On institutional coordination, we find that a large majority of countries have appointed a lead unit or agency to coordinate the SDGs, but only around a third of the countries surveyed locate this unit at the center of government (in cabinet offices or within the offices of the President or Prime Minister) (Figure 3.3). The majority position it in a central ministry (of economy, planning, public administration, or environment, for example), while Spain has a dedicated Ministry of Social Rights and the 2030 Agenda. The survey does not evaluate, in practice, the effectiveness and influence of such coordination mechanisms and units in driving a whole-of-government approach to SDG implementation.

Note: “Center of government” refers to the designated unit being in the President’s or Prime Minister’s office or as a cabinet-level position. “A line ministry” refers to the ministry of finance, economic development, planning, public service or administration, environment or similar. “Foreign affairs” refers to the ministry of foreign affairs, international cooperation or similar.

Source: SDSN 2023 Survey of Government Efforts for the SDGs (February 2023).

A large majority of governments – 83 percent of those surveyed – have published some form of strategic vision and/or action plan to implement the goals. For many, this takes the form of a national sustainability strategy explicitly linked to the 2030 Agenda goals and targets. Some countries take a mainstreaming approach, where SDGs are implemented by each government ministry within the scope of its mandate (instead of via an overarching national action plan). The mainstreaming approach was used by the European Union, which also adopted the European Green Deal as its main strategic roadmap for achieving sustainable development. Our survey cannot evaluate the breadth or actualization of these strategic visions and action plans, although SDSN has published a detailed analysis of SDG integration in post-COVID-19 recovery and resilience plans in the European Union (Lafortune et al., 2021). The next subsection goes beyond references to SDG and describes persistent gaps in sectoral policy measures for major SDG transformations in greater detail.

Source: SDSN 2023 Survey of Government Efforts for the SDGs (February 2023).

Most countries surveyed had also defined SDG monitoring systems. More than two-thirds (68 percent) have adapted the SDG framework to their context and identified a set of nationally relevant indicators. Often these are aligned with official United Nations SDG indicators or represent a subset of them. Some countries have also developed localized indicators that account for country contexts. For example, France has a national dashboard of 98 SDG indicators, adopted after several rounds of consultations, which includes indicators that go beyond the official UN SDG indicator framework. France also contributes to global statistical efforts by working with UN agencies to report data points across all 231 official global indicators. An average of 136 indicators are included in national frameworks for monitoring the SDGs. Many countries have also developed online platforms to report on progress towards the goals. The survey does not evaluate the integration and influence of such monitoring tools within broader policy, regulatory, and budget cycles, however it has recently been suggested that SDG monitoring frameworks so far suffer from insufficient linkages to policy implementation as well as low overall visibility (Lepenies et al, 2023). Supreme audit institutions and parliamentary processes have also been used in some countries to track efforts to implement the SDGs (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2018 and 2021; INTOSAI, 2019; European Parliament, 2022).

As in previous years, there is some discrepancy between expressed political support for the SDGs and integration of the goals into strategic public policy processes, especially long-term budget and investment frameworks. A little over a third of governments surveyed (36 percent) mention the SDGs or use related terms in their latest official budget document. Among these 27 countries, less than half go beyond this to include the SDGs in a dedicated section, budget lines, or allocation. Some countries specifically refer to the SDGs in their national budget to support domestic SDG implementation nationally (including through national health, education, social protection, or economic development reforms), abroad (for example, in aid allocation or foreign policy), or both. Looking ahead, establishing stronger connections between SDG gaps, targets, monitoring systems, and multi-year budget allocations remains an important priority.

As G20 countries represent two-thirds of the world’s population and 85 percent of global GDP, integrating the SDGs into their governance systems is particularly important. Compared with other countries, G20 countries tend to lag in several aspects of institutional leadership for the SDGs, including explicit political support in speeches and monitoring and coordination mechanisms. The integration of the SDGs in national budget processes could be strengthened in most countries, and especially in LICs and LMICs, where less a third of the countries surveyed refer to the SDGs in their national budgets – either in the narrative or as a dedicated section or budget line.

The SDGs require long-term directed change, with long-term investment plans essential for national success in meeting the goals. SDSN has recommended six inter-related long-term transformations:

1. Universal quality education and innovation-based economy

2. Universal health coverage

3. Zero-carbon energy systems

4. Sustainable ecosystems, sustainable agriculture, and climate resilience

5. Sustainable cities

6. Transformation to universal digital access and services

Each of these challenges requires large-scale public and private investments to mid-century. Each requires a technological transformation. Each requires a financing strategy to underpin the investment plans and monitoring systems. None can be solved by the private sector alone. Governments must take the lead in all six areas to design policy and financial frameworks within which business can profitably invest and innovate.

Building on the work of previous Sustainable Development Reports, we present here an updated and improved version of the SDG Transformation scorecards, to evaluate how the SDGs are being integrated into sectoral plans. Each scorecard consists of a collection of headline policy and investment measures to track SDG implementation. These scorecards complement the SDG Index, which is based on outcome data (for example, on poverty rates, life expectancy, and CO₂ emissions). At the international level, such measures of outcome tend to present significant time lags: they may not adequately reflect the impact of transformative policies and investments that governments have introduced since the adoption of the SDGs, and which often yield results only in the medium or long term. The scorecards instead focus on the enabling legal, regulatory, and investment conditions needed to achieve the SDGs and the objectives of the Paris Climate Agreement.

This exercise has several caveats and limitations. First, internationally comparable policy trackers and measures (such as laws, regulations, investments, and subsidies) tend to be less available than international outcome data. They rely on more qualitative methods and require an advanced understanding of policy areas and country policies and contexts (generally, more comparable policy trackers and measures are available for OECD countries than for others). Second, policy efforts need to be interpreted with an understanding of national challenges and contexts (for instance, the absence of advanced cybersecurity policies matters less in a country with low internet access and poor digital infrastructure). Third, apart from a few exceptions, government pledges and policies do not capture their effective implementation. And fourth, targets or thresholds to gauge policy ambitions are not always clearly defined.

The rest of this section provides a brief overview of countries’ policy efforts and commitments relating to achieving the six SDG Transformations, and highlights where more research and policy trackers are required to broaden our understanding of national SDG efforts. We present detailed results for the G20 countries, along with population-weighted averages by geographic region and income group. Detailed information on indicator sources, thresholds and results for all 193 UN Member States are accessible online.

Education builds human capital, which in turn promotes economic growth, innovation, decent work, and the elimination of extreme poverty, and helps overcome gender and other inequalities. Countries must further expand and transform education systems. SDG target 4.1 calls for universal access to 12 years of free primary and secondary education, with at least 9 years compulsory.

This scorecard shows that many countries around the world currently fall short of this target. To reduce inequalities, governments also need to expand social safety nets. These should be complemented by anti-discrimination measures (including those furthering gender equality); improved labor standards; and measures to end all forms of modern slavery, trafficking, and child labor. Investments in research and development will also help to promote economic growth, which can contribute to reducing inequalities.

Looking ahead, a lead global indicator must be established to assess country efforts to strengthen their population’s and students’ knowledge of sustainable development and their ability to navigate an information-rich environment. This is important to achieve long-term science-based transformations of all economies, and to build up public support and accountability. According to the OECD, only one in 10 students in OECD countries can distinguish between fact and opinion (OECD, 2018).

Note: Regional and income level averages are population weighted. Details on definitions, sources, and thresholds are available on www.sdgindex.org

Source: Authors’ analysis

This Transformation promotes key investments in health and well-being. It aligns closely with SDG Target 3.8, achieving universal health coverage and ensuring that all people have access to the health services they need. In the SDGs, universal health care (UHC) is considered a target in itself. For the SDG Transformation scorecards, however, we consider UHC an enabler (input) for greater health outcomes. Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, the WHO and other international institutions had lamented the slow pace of progress towards achieving universal health coverage (WHO, 2019). Compared with the rest of the world, a higher percentage of people in OECD countries tend to be covered by public or mandatory private health insurance, and incidence rates of catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditures are lower – although there are exceptions, including Mexico, Costa Rica, Poland, and the United States.

The SDGs also call on all countries to strengthen their capacities for early warning, risk reduction, and the management of national and global health risks (SDG target 3.d). As a measure of pandemic preparedness, the Global Health Security Index turned out to be a rather poor predictor of effective early response to COVID-19, as measured by the number of cases and deaths (Lafortune, 2020), indicating that important factors are at play that are not yet adequately captured by existing policy trackers. Nevertheless, we have not identified a better policy-focused indicator of pandemic preparedness. In the context of the High-Level Pandemic Summit to take place in September 2023 and the forthcoming global pandemic treaty, it remains vital to define solid international measures and monitoring systems that can better gauge countries’ preparedness for global health security threats. But it is also important to address drivers that can lead to the emergence of new pathogens, including environmental drivers, through “One Health” approaches (Sachs et al, 2022; McKee et al, 2021).

Note: Regional and income level averages are population weighted. Details on definitions, sources, and thresholds are available on www.sdgindex.org

Source: Authors’ analysis

This Transformation aims to ensure universal access to modern energy sources; decarbonize the energy system by mid-century (in line with the Paris Agreement); and reduce industrial pollution of soil, water, and air. More than 130 countries are signatories to the UN Climate Ambition Alliance, and more than 50 have anchored their net-zero commitment in a law or policy document (Net Zero Tracker, 2023; UNFCCC, 2022). By September 2022, 139 countries had submitted or updated nationally determined contributions (NDCs), with studies finding that new and updated NDCs present more ambitious emission-reduction targets and planning (WRI, 2022).

There continues to be a major discrepancy between countries’ self-declared ambitions and their tangible efforts and policies. The Climate Action Tracker, an independent scientific analysis of governments’ climate actions, finds that no single G20 country has adopted a sufficient mix of policies and actions to achieve the Paris Climate Agreement objectives, with only the United Kingdom reaching an “almost sufficient” level of policy (Climate Action Tracker, 2022). Many countries continue to provide substantial subsidies for fossil fuels, undermining their initiatives to decarbonize the energy system, such as the United States’ Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the European Union’s Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) (DGAP 2023). While comparable country-level data are not yet available, the IEA has concluded that global fossil-fuel consumption subsidies rose sharply in 2022, as governments attempted to shield consumers from rising energy bills (IEA 2023, OECD 2022).

Note: Regional and income level averages are population weighted. Details on definitions, sources, and thresholds are available on www.sdgindex.org

Source: Authors’ analysis

Unsustainable consumption is strongly interconnected with diets, land-use policies, and the health of major ecosystems. This is why Transformation 4 calls for integrated transformations to address dietary shifts, biodiversity, agricultural systems, and land-use policies. Bringing these elements together is a main difference between the Six Transformations and the “six entry points for action” presented in the Global Sustainable Development Report (GSDR, 2023), which treats “Sustainable Food Systems and Healthy Nutrition” and the “Global Environmental Commons” as two separate entry points.

Today’s land-use practices and food systems have led to persistent hunger, malnutrition, and obesity. They account for a quarter of greenhouse gas emissions, over 90 percent of scarcity-weighted water use, most biodiversity loss, the overexploitation of fish populations, eutrophication through nutrient overload, and the pollution of our water and air. Food systems are also highly vulnerable to climate change and land degradation: integrated strategies are vital to ensure that these systems, along with land-use practices and ocean ecosystems, are sustainable and healthy for people. The Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted in December 2022 during the 15th Convention of Parties in Canada, calls to protect and conserve at least 30 percent of terrestrial, inland water and coastal and marine areas by 2030, “especially areas of particular importance for biodiversity and ecosystem functions and services” (UN, 2022).

UNEP estimates that 84 percent of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have now adopted climate adaptation plans, strategies, laws, and policies (UNEP, 2022). But there is a significant gap in funding these measures. Annual adaptation funding needs are expected to reach US$160 billion to US$340 billion by 2030, and US$315 billion to US$565 billion by 2050 (UNEP, 2022). Establishing mechanisms to ensure that the burden of financing human-induced adaptation is shared fairly and globally, and that the countries responsible pay the costs of loss and damages, remains an important priority for the international community.

The SDSN is highly committed to supporting global and national efforts to develop sustainable food and land systems, preserve major ecosystems, and ensure adequate finance for nature and climate adaptation. In close collaboration with the Food and Land Use Coalition (FOLU), the SDSN’s FABLE and FELD projects provide support for long-term, sustainable food and land use pathways and policies. Despite the recognized importance of decarbonizing agriculture and enhancing carbon sinks towards achieving the objectives of the Paris Climate Agreement, FELD recently documented the limited integration of food and land policies into NDCs (FELD, 2022). Other flagship projects include the Global Commons Stewardship Initiative (led by the Center for Global Commons at the University of Tokyo in cooperation with SDSN and other partners) and the Science Panel for the Amazon (CGC, SDSN and Yale, 2023; CGC, SYSTEMIQ, SDSN et al, 2022). Considering the complexity and far-reaching nature of this Transformation, we are not yet in a position to present a scorecard for Transformation 4.

Cities and other urban areas are home to around 55 percent of humanity, and account for 70 percent of global economic output. By 2050, these shares will increase to 70 and 85 percent, respectively (Jiang and O’Neill, 2017). The OECD estimates that 105 of the 169 SDG targets will not be reached without sufficiently engaging sub-national governments (OECD, 2020). the COVID-19 pandemic has had lasting impacts on urban mobility, land use, property values, and transport systems in developed and developing countries alike. Many urban organizations and associations have mainstreamed the SDGs into their work programs, including C40, UN-Habitat, United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), and Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI), as well as the OECD’s Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs, Cities and Regions.

By design, Transformation 5 calls for regional and local policy trackers. These would notably track efforts at the regional and city level to curb urban pollution, increase housing affordability, and strengthen mobility and access to public transport. Other policy measures could be considered proxies of local government commitment to achieving the triple objective of being economically productive, socially inclusive, and environmentally sustainable. SDSN is working with local partners to strengthen policy frameworks in regions and cities, and to reinforce the science-policy interface at the subnational level.

In early 2023, the OECD, SDSN, and the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) conducted a survey to take stock of city and regional SDG progress. Previous surveys on the topic were conducted by the OECD and the CoR in 2019 and 2020.

Artificial intelligence and other digital technologies are disrupting almost every sector of the economy: agriculture (precision agriculture), mining (autonomous vehicles), manufacturing (robotics), retail (e-commerce), finance (e-payments, trading strategies), media (social networks), health (diagnostics, telemedicine), education (online learning), public administration (e-governance, e-voting), and more recently, clerical, drafting, research and creative work (generative AI), as well as other fields in science and technology.

Digital technologies can raise productivity, lower production costs, reduce emissions, expand access, dematerialize production, improve matching in markets, enable the use of big and unconventional data, and make public services more readily available. They can also improve resource-use efficiencies, support the circular economy, enable zero-carbon energy systems, help monitor and protect ecosystems, and assume other critical roles in support of the SDGs. Yet the disruptive nature of new technologies calls for deliberative exchanges and consultations with multiple stakeholders and careful assessment of distributional impacts and trade-offs.

Countries face different challenges depending on the maturity of their digital infrastructure and technologies. Less-connected countries especially need to invest to provide widespread, affordable internet access and promote digital literacy. Yet issues surrounding privacy, cybersecurity, e-government, digital inclusion, and the robustness of digital regulatory frameworks concern all countries.

The Transformation 6 scorecard builds on the World Bank’s Digitalization for Development policy framework (World Bank, 2022). It aims to capture efforts made to strengthen digital infrastructure, data security, and government platforms and services, as well as the promotion of key enablers such as digital literacy and privacy and inclusiveness (including bringing a social and gender perspective to digital and technology policies). For now, the scorecard captures a subset of these different elements: we aim to improve coverage over time. UN DESA’s Online Services Index assesses the quality of government provision of online services; the ITU’s ICT Regulatory Tracker is a composite score of regulatory and competition framework for the ICT sector; UNCTAD’s Global Cyberlaw tracker maps legislation on e-commerce, consumer and data protection and cybercrime; and, finally, the Inclusive Internet Index’s policy score assesses a set of policies on digital inclusion for women and children and safety and privacy, as well as policies aiming to increase broadband and 5G access.

Further analyses will be needed to capture policies and regulations supporting “last-mile inclusion”, particularly in relation to financial services and digital literacy, and participation and trust in digital institutions (BCG 2020, Morell-Ducós 2021, Shree, S., Pratap, B., Saroy, R. 2021, CGAP/World Bank 2020). Trackers are also needed to better gauge the quality of internet regulations, measure access to e-government services and evaluate their quality, and to assess government readiness to respond to and to prevent cybersecurity threats.

Note: Regional and income level averages are population weighted. Details on definitions, sources, and thresholds are available on www.sdgindex.org

Source: Authors' analysis

Achieving the SDGs requires global cooperation under the UN Charter. The Charter, signed in 1945, is the founding document of the United Nations. It codifies the major principles of international relations, from the sovereign equality of States to the prohibition of the use of force in international relations. Climate change, peace, cybersecurity, reliable data and information, and pandemic prevention and response all depend on close collaboration across countries and a strong multilateral system, while global supply chains and financial flows can either support or undermine countries’ efforts to achieve the SDGs. The 2015 Declaration, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, recalls that:

“Seventy years ago, an earlier generation of world leaders came together to create the United Nations. From the ashes of war and division they fashioned this Organization and the values of peace, dialogue and international cooperation which underpin it. The supreme embodiment of those values is the Charter of the United Nations.”

The SDGs are not only a public policy framework; they are an ethical imperative grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which celebrates its 75th anniversary this year. The SDGs are based on the core premises of the Universal Declaration, that, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights … and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood,” and that “it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations”. In 2022, the United Nations Secretary-General appointed a High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, with a mandate to develop a list of concrete, actionable recommendations to improve international cooperation and advance the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. We therefore consider that promoting multilateralism and global cooperation under the UN Charter is an important component of countries’ efforts and commitments for the SDGs.

This section is an attempt to take stock of countries’ efforts to adhere to the values and principles of multilateralism in order to achieve sustainable development. To our knowledge, there is currently no overarching measure that captures the many dimensions of support for multilateralism. The International Peace Institute’s 2022 Index of Multilateralism explored the state of multilateralism globally, but it did not compare country engagement (IPI, 2022). Other reports focus on mapping the size of diplomatic networks or measuring specific aspects of multilateral efforts (e.g., peace or official development assistance). The assessment presented this year is a pilot that we aim to improve and expand in coming years. We welcome comments and feedback.

We present a variety of proxy indicators to gauge countries’ ratification of UN treaties, their membership in UN institutions, unilateral sanctions they have adopted against other UN Member States, and their efforts to promote global solidarity – including international financial flows – and peace. In most cases, we aim to capture the latest period (2018–2022) or the latest available data points. The variables related to the ratification of treaties and the adoption of unilateral coercive measures cover 1946–2022 and 1950–2021 respectively. This assessment is based on UN databases and several third-party sources. For presentational reasons, the tables and charts cover only OECD, G20, and large economies. The full database and additional material are accessible online.

Percentage of UN Treaties ratified: This indicator covers all Conventions, International Conventions, and Agreements adopted by the United Nations from 1946–2022, including those adopted before 1946 that were later added to the UN Treaty system. It excludes Protocols, Optional Protocols, and Amendments, as well as Conventions that were later terminated or only applied to a small number of countries. For each of the 150 treaties, we recorded whether Member States had signed or ratified them. Signature of a treaty is not legally binding, whereas ratification (or acceptance, accession, definitive signature, and succession) is legally binding. The indicator for the percentage of UN treaties ratified (all international) shows the percentage of these 150 treaties that each Member State has ratified, whereas the percentage of UN treaties ratified (selective) indicator shows the percentage each country has ratified of a select list of 58 treaties. This shorter list includes only those treaties ratified by more than 50 percent of UN Member States. Austria, Hungary, Italy, Nigeria, Spain, and Sweden have ratified more than 98 percent of all treaties in the selective list. By contrast, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States have ratified less than 75 percent (selective list) (Figure 3.6).

Note: Countries listed in descending order of the % UN treaties ratified (selective list).

Source: Authors based on UN Treaty Collection

Unilateral coercive measures (UCMs): This indicator reviews the adoption by UN Member States of unilateral sanctions against another UN Member State. Several UN resolutions stress that unilateral coercive measures and practices are “contrary to international law, international humanitarian law, the UN Charter and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States, and highlight that on long-term, these measures may result in social problems and raise humanitarian concerns in the States targeted.”¹ In 2014, the Human Rights Council created the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights.

Since 1966, the Security Council has established 31 sanctions regimes: in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the former Yugoslavia (2), Haiti (2), Angola, Liberia (3), Eritrea/Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Iran, Somalia/Eritrea, Iraq (2), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Lebanon, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Libya (2), Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Yemen, South Sudan and Mali, as well as sanctions on ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida, and the Taliban. The famous 1977 United Nations Security Council Resolution 418 unanimously imposed a sanctions regime against Apartheid South Africa.

The data on UCMs presented in this report come from the Drexel Global Sanctions Database (V3, March 2023), which provides information on sanctions adopted against other countries, including the beginning and final year of sanction imposition. Here we present sanctions adopted unilaterally from 1950 to 2021 that are still in place as of 2022. For our purposes, a sanction is considered unilateral if it has not been approved by the UN Security Council, even if it is imposed by multiple countries. Percentages represent the share of all sanctions that a country or region has adopted to 2021. For EU member states, for example, this includes EU sanctions as well as sanctions that the country has imposed individually. Sanctions imposed by the European Union after Brexit were allocated as separate sanctions for the UK.

Note: Countries listed in descending order of the % UN treaties ratified (selective list).

Source: Authors, based on Drexel Global Sanctions Database

Membership and participation in selected United Nations organizations: This indicator captures membership in 24 United Nations organizations: all 15 specialized agencies, all 6 United Nations funds and programmes, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These organizations were selected to represent a broad range of issues related to sustainable development (education, health, finance, trade, telecommunication, and industrial policies), as well as including all of the specialized agencies.

Source: Authors analysis

UN Specialized Agencies: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); the International Labour Organization (ILO); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Maritime Organization (IMO); the International Telecommunication Union (ITU); the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO); the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO); the Universal Postal Union (UPU; the World Health Organization (WHO); the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); the World Meteorological Organization (WMO); and the World Bank Group – including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). United Nations funds and programmes: UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Environment Programme (UNEP), UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP).

Memberships were verified as of May 2023 via each organization’s website. Several OECD countries are no longer members of UNIDO; the United States and Israel withdrew funding to UNESCO in 2011 and withdrew their membership in 2019.

Militarization and participation in conflicts: This indicator aims to capture countries’ efforts to promote and preserve peace. It identifies countries’ level of military build-up and access to weapons, as well as their participation in ongoing domestic and military conflicts. It builds on data provided in the Global Peace Index 2022 (compiled by the Institute for Economics and Peace). The Ongoing Conflict Score builds on six indicators to investigate the extent to which countries are involved in internal and external conflicts, as well as their role and the duration of their Involvement. The Militarization Score reflects countries’ level of military build-up and access to weapons, as well as their level of peacefulness, both domestically and internationally. Comparable data on military expenditure as a percentage of GDP and the number of armed service officers per capita are gauged, as are financial contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Overall, among G20, OECD and large countries, Czechia, Iceland, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Portugal obtain the highest (best) scores, whereas Israel and the Russian Federation obtain the lowest (worst) scores.

Note: Countries listed in ascending order of the average between both pillars. From 0 (best/more peaceful) to 5 (worst/less peaceful).

Source: Authors, based on Global Peace Index 2022 (compiled by the Institute for Economics and Peace).

International Solidarity and Financing: We present data compiled by the OECD on Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a headline indicator of international solidarity. In 2022, only five DAC members – Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden – had met or exceeded the 0.7 percent ODA target. When computing overall scores, we use the average ratio of ODA/GNI over the past five years (Figure 3.10). In 2022, ODA rose by 13.6 percent in real terms, driven primarily by the sharp increase of in-donor refugee costs (OECD, 2023b).

Note: OECD, 2022 (2022 ODA data based on preliminary release, all other years from final data). Countries listed in descending order of the average ratio ODA/GNI over the period 2018-2022.

Source: Authors, based on OECD

Building on the Six Transformations scorecards, the SDSN survey of government efforts for the SDGs, and a subset of variables related to government support for multilateralism under the United Nations Charter, we present here overall scores rating government efforts and commitment to the SDGs. These scores range from 0 (very low SDG commitment) to 100 (very high SDG commitment) and cover all 74 countries in the 2023 SDG Policy Coordination Survey presented in section 3.1, including all G20 members and most OECD countries. Scores draw on 29 indicators of policy efforts and commitment. Since the 2022 pilot, we have added four new indicators on digitalization and five on engagement with multilateralism. We have also made some methodological changes: these are explained in greater detail in a technical annex available online, which also discusses the full list of indicators, the weighting scheme applied, and various sensitivity tests used in developing these scores. We welcome critical comments and feedback that may help to strengthen future iterations of this work.

Note: For Pillar 2, the indicators listed correspond to the overall score for each Transformation Scorecard. This year, we could not compute scores for Transformation 4 (Sustainable ecosystems, sustainable agriculture, and climate resilience) and Transformation 5 (Sustainable cities). Under pillar 3, the use of unilateral coercive measures correspond to measures adopted over the period 1950 to 2021 that are still in place in 2022. They exclude measures adopted since January, 1 2022 and measures supported by UN resolutions. Political leadership and institutional coordination is weighted 50% of the total score, SDG integration into sectoral policies and pathways is weighted 40%, and the pilot score for multilateralism counts for 10% (as this latter pillar remains a pilot this year). A Monte Carlo simulation is accessible online showing how scores would vary with different weighting systems. Other sensitivity tests are also provided, including various aggregation methods (geometric mean vs arithmetic mean). Further information is accessible on sdgindex.org.

Source: Authors analysis

At the midpoint of the 2030 Agenda, we draw five major conclusions from this comprehensive assessment of policy efforts and commitment to the SDGs (Table 3.6). First, government efforts and commitment to the SDGs remains far too low. The average score of the 74 countries assessed is 56 percent, with none even close to obtaining a perfect score. Second, there are major differences across countries. Four European countries stand out as being very committed to the SDGs (Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland), but scores among the G20 countries range from 77 percent in Indonesia to less than 40 percent in the Russian Federation and the United States. Third, of the three pillars, scores are on average lowest for the second one, related to adopting and implementing SDG policies and pathways. This is driven in part by the moderate or low performance of LICs and LMICs on this pillar, as these countries may lack the financial resources needed to successfully adopt and implement SDG investments and pathways. The HICs’ somewhat better performance on pillar 2 is largely due to their strong performance on the education, health and digital scorecards. More ambitious policies and actions on climate and decarbonization are needed. (This year’s edition does not track efforts on sustainable food and land-use transformation, which is an important research agenda at the SDSN.) Fourth, LICs and LMICs score more highly on political leadership and institutional leadership for the SDGs than HICs. Fifth, all countries can do more to promote multilateralism, in line with the United Nations Charter. Argentina, Barbados, Chile, Germany, Jamaica and Seychelles score highest for their efforts to promote multilateralism, yet no country obtains a perfect score.

Note: The data for Ukraine correspond to the situation prior to February 2022, as many data points have not been updated since then.

Source: Authors analysis

Some countries perform significantly better on SDG government efforts and commitment than would be expected from their 2015 baseline level of SDG achievement and GDP. We assume that rich countries with high educational levels and good health and infrastructure systems would have greater access to capital to invest in SDG transformations. Yet government efforts for the SDGs in 2023 correlate only moderately to their 2015 SDG Index scores and per-capita GDP in 2015. Benin, Ghana, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Senegal are just some of the countries that are performing much better on the SDG government effort measure than would be predicted from their baseline SDG Index levels and 2015 per-capita GDP. In contrast, a few countries with very high per-capita GDPs (US$50,000 and above) and SDG Index scores (75 percent and above), such as Australia and the United States, demonstrate only a limited commitment to the SDGs, with apparently limited efforts made. See additional material available online.

Note that this score focuses on federal or national government efforts for the SDGs and may not be representative of initiatives and policies adopted at subnational levels – in regions, provinces, metropolitan areas, and cities. It has been SDSN’s privilege to also work with municipal and metropolitan area associations in the United States and Brazil (ICS and SDSN, 2021; Lynch et al., 2019).

At this midpoint of the 2030 Agenda, all countries, richer and poorer alike, should use the half-way momentum to critically review and revise their national strategies, taking the 2030 Agenda principles as a yardstick (transformative, integrated, inclusive, leaving no one behind). International financing flows should be aligned with countries’ SDG needs as well as their commitments.