In 2015, all UN member states committed to SDG 17, to revitalize global partnership for sustainable development. The UN Summit of the Future in September 2024 is a “once-in-a-generation opportunity” to “mend eroded trust and demonstrate that international cooperation can effectively tackle current challenges as well as those that have emerged in recent years or may yet be over the horizon” (UN 2024). In 2025, the World Social Summit “will provide an opportunity for the international community to strengthen the United Nations’ framework for effective social development” (Club de Madrid 2022). During this year’s High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, SDG16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions) and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals) will be specifically under review by the international community.
Building on previous editions, this chapter aims to gauge countries’ efforts and commitment to UN-based multilateralism and the SDGs. It uses sound data and metrics to evaluate nation-states’ efforts to adhere to the principles of the UN Charter and implement the SDGs. This year’s chapter presents an improved, updated and universal Index of Countries’ Support to UN-Based Multilateralism (UN-Mi). Nation-states are still at the center of the multilateral system and should therefore be held accountable for promoting UN-based multilateralism and implementing SDG17 (Partnerships for the Goals).
Building on the methodology presented in the pilot working paper (Sachs, Lafortune and Drumm, November 2023), we gauge countries’ commitment to UN-based multilateralism by focusing on six headline indicators:
1. Ratification of major UN treaties
2. Percentage of votes aligned with the international majority at the UN General Assembly (UNGA)
3. Participation in selected UN organizations and agencies
4. Participation in conflicts and militarization
5. The use of unilateral coercive measures (UCMs)
6. Contribute to the UN budget and international solidarity
We first present the overall score and ranking for this year’s Index of Government Support to UN-Based Multilateralism (UN-Mi). We then describe and present each indicator used in the UN-Mi and, building on previous editions, also discuss specific government efforts to promote and implement the SDGs.
The 2024 Index of Countries’ Support to UN-Based Multilateralism (UN-Mi)
Overall, we find that the majority of the world’s population live in countries with moderate to high levels of support for UN-based multilateralism. The average UN-Mi across all 193 UN member states is 65 and the median is 70. We estimate that 90% of the world’s population lives in a country with a UN-Mi score above 50; which means they are more than halfway towards perfect support to UN-based multilateralism. As an example, out of 193 UN member states, 90% have ratified two-thirds or more of the major UN treaties, 66% vote with the international majority at UNGA two-thirds of the time, more than half (55%) are members of the 24 organizations and entities considered, 80% have limited or no participation in conflicts and militarization, around 70% make no use or very limited use of UCMs, and the vast majority are not subject to the provisions of Article 19 related to significant arrears in the payment of dues to the UN.
Figure 3.1.1 | The 2024 Index of Countries' Support to UN-Based Multilateralism (UN-Mi)
Figure 3.1.2 | The 2024 Index of Countries' Support to UN-Based Multilateralism (UN-Mi)
However, there are significant differences in support to UN-based multilateralism across countries and country groupings. Overall, Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, and Uruguay top the 2024 UN-Mi – with scores above 90 percent. By contrast, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Israel, South Sudan, Somalia, and the United States are the ten countries least committed to UN-based multilateralism, all with scores below 50 percent (and below 40 percent for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Israel, South Sudan, Somalia and the United States).
Detailed indicator and country results
In this report, we focus on G20 and large countries (those with more than 100 million inhabitants) in presenting detailed indicator results. The full dataset is, however, accessible online.
The first indicator is “Percentage of major UN treaties ratified”. This indicator covers 59 Conventions, International Conventions, and Agreements adopted by the United Nations from 1946–2023, including those adopted before 1946 that were later added to the UN treaty system. It covers UN instruments ratified by more than 50 percent of the international community. It excludes Protocols, Optional Protocols, and Amendments, as well as Conventions that were later terminated or only applied to a small number of countries. We recorded whether member states have signed or ratified them. Signature of a treaty is not legally binding, however, ratification (or acceptance, accession, definitive signature, and succession) is. Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom have all ratified more than 90% of major UN treaties. By contrast, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States have ratified fewer than 75 percent.
Box 3.1. Method's Summary
The Index of Government Support to UN-Based Multilateralism (UN-Mi) aims to gauge countries’ support to UN-based multilateralism under the 1945 United Nations Charter, and especially its Article 1. Unlike other existing initiatives (International Peace Institute and Institute for Economics and Peace 2022; Global Nation 2023) we focus on nation states rather than looking at the world as one single bloc or observation.
To compile the UN-Mi, we made use of the UN library and website as well as third-party data. Python scripts were used to compile the historical dataset of UNGA votes over time and extract UN treaty ratification data. It is beyond the scope of the UN-Mi to evaluate the implementation of UN treaties in practice. Membership in UN organizations and the payment of dues was tracked via desk research. Finally, we use the Global Peace Index, SIPRI, the Drexel Database and OECD/DAC data to track, respectively, participation in conflicts, military expenditure, use of Unilateral Coercive measures, and official development assistance as a share of GNI.
The year of reference is either the latest year for which data are available (for example, membership in UN organizations as of 2023, the 2023 Global Peace Index scores, the list of countries in arrears of payment to the UN under the terms of Article 19 of the UN Charter as of January 2024), or in the case of ODA/GNI, an average across the last five years (to reduce the potential effect of year-on-year volatility). The UCM variable tracks sanctions introduced before January 1, 2022 that are still ongoing.
The indicators were normalized on a scale from 0–100 using the min-max method, where 0 corresponds to low support and 100 to high support to UN-based multilateralism. The UN-Mi is compiled as the arithmetic weighted average of all the normalized indicators.
Further details are available in Sachs, Lafortune and Drumm (2023) and Lafortune and Sachs (2024, forthcoming). The full dataset for this year’s UN-Mi is accessible at https://sdgtransformationcenter.org/
Figure 3.3 presents more specifically the ratification status of the nine UN human rights treaties. Around 80 percent of all 193 UN member states have ratified at least seven of these. Because neither the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families nor the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance have been ratified by 50 percent of the international community, they are not included in the UN-Mi calculation. Among G20 and large countries, only Argentina, Mexico and Nigeria have ratified all nine of these UN human rights treaties. By contrast, the United States is among only nine countries that have ratified fewer than four, and the only one of the G20 and large countries to have ratified fewer than five.
Figure 3.2 | Major UN treaties ratified, G20 and large countries, 1945-2023
Note: Treaties ratified by 50%+ of UN member states. N=59. As of January 1, 2024.
Source: Authors' calculations based on UN treaty database.
Figure 3.3 | Ratification status of the nine UN human rights' Treaties, G20 and large countries
Note: Covers the nine UN human rights' treaties (excluding optional protocols): 1. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), 1965; 2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966; 3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 1966; 4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1979; 5. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 1984; 6. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1989; 7. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW), 1990; 8. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED), 2006; 9. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 2006. Source: Authors' elaboration, based on https://indicators.ohchr.org/
The second indicator relates to “Percentage of votes aligned with the majority vote at the UN General Assembly”. Chapter IV of the UN Charter describes the role and function of the UN General Assembly, or UNGA, which is the main decision-making body of the United Nations. This indicator considers 5,256 UNGA resolutions with a recorded vote since 1945. It establishes the percentage of times that each UN member state voted with the simple international majority (not weighted by population) out of a total of 482 recorded votes over the period 2018–2022. The data were obtained from the UN digital library via python web scraping. For each resolution, UN member states can vote yes or no, abstain, or be absent. In the vast majority of cases (98% of the time) the majority vote is yes. The UNGA votes of Argentina, Bangladesh and the Philippines were aligned with the majority vote 90 percent of the time. By contrast, the votes of Australia and Canada were aligned with the majority vote less than 50 percent of the time, with those of the United States aligned less than 25 percent.
Figure 3.4 | Percentage of votes aligned with the majority vote at the UN General Assembly, G20 and large countries, 2018-2022
Note: Simple majority (not population weighted). Votes recorded between 2018 and 2022. N=482 recorded votes.
Source: Authors' calculations, based on UN Digital Library voting data
The third indicator refers to “Membership and participation in selected United Nations organizations”. Chapter IX of the UN Charter describes the role of specialized agencies in fostering international economic and social cooperation. This indicator captures membership in 24 UN organizations: all 15 specialized agencies,1the 6 United Nations funds and programmes (UNDP, UNEP, UNFPA, UN-HABITAT, UNICEF and WFP), the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These were selected to represent a broad range of issues related to sustainable development (education, health, finance, trade, telecommunication, and industrial policies), as well as including all of the specialized agencies. Most G20 and large countries are members of all 24, however Australia is not a member of UNIDO, UNWTO or IFAD; Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States are not members of UNIDO and UNWTO; the Russian Federation is not a member of UNWTO: France left UNIDO in 2014; and as of 2023, Ethiopia is not a member of WTO.
The fourth indicator relates to “Participation in conflicts and militarization”. As emphasized in the Preamble of the UN Charter, all UN member states are supposed to “practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours” and “unite [their] strength to maintain international peace and security.” This indicator captures each country’s participation in conflicts and military build-up, using data provided by the Global Peace Index (GPI) 2023 and compiled by the Institute for Economics and Peace. The indicator is computed as the simple average of GPI Pillar 1 (Ongoing domestic and international conflict) and Pillar 2 (Militarization) (IEP 2023). Comparable data on military expenditure as a percentage of GDP and the number of armed service officers per capita are included, as are financial contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Argentina, Canada, Germany, and Japan perform best among G20 and large countries on this indicator. By contrast the Russian Federation performs the worst.
Figure 3.5 | Membership in selected UN organizations, G20 and large countries, 2023
Note: Max = 24. As of January 1, 2024.
Source: Authors, data compiled via desk research on individual organizations and agencies' web portals
Figure 3.6 | Participation in conflicts and militarization, G20 and large countries, 2023
Note: From 1 (best) to 5 (worst).
Source: Authors' elaboration, based on IEP' Global Peace Index.
The fifth indicator is related to the “Use of unilateral coercive measures (UCMs)”. This indicator reviews the adoption by UN member states of unilateral sanctions against another UN member state. Several UN resolutions stress that unilateral coercive measures and practices “are contrary to international law, international humanitarian law, the UN Charter and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States, and highlight that on long-term, these measures may result in social problems and raise humanitarian concerns in the States targeted” (OHCHR 2024). In 2014, the Human Rights Council created the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights.
Figure 3.7 | Use of unilateral coercive measures (UCMs), G20 and large countries, number (1950-2022)
Note: UCMs adopted between 1950 and 2021 that continued into 2022.
Source: Authors, based on Drexel Global Sanctions Database
Since 1966, the Security Council has established 31 sanctions regimes: in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the former Yugoslavia (2), Haiti (2), Angola, Liberia (3), Eritrea/Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Iran, Somalia/Eritrea, Iraq (2), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Lebanon, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Libya (2), Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic, Yemen, South Sudan and Mali, as well as sanctions on ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida and on the Taliban. The famous 1977 United Nations Security Council Resolution 418 unanimously imposed a sanctions regime against apartheid South Africa.
The data on UCMs presented in this report come from the Drexel Global Sanctions Database (V3, March 2023), which provides information on sanctions adopted against other countries, including the beginning and final year of sanction imposition (Felbermayr et al. 2020; Drexel University, WIFO, and Hochschule Konstanz University of Applied Sciences 2023). Here we present sanctions adopted unilaterally from 1950 to 2021 that are still in place as of 2022. For our purpose, a sanction is considered unilateral if it has not been approved by the UN Security Council, even if it is imposed by multiple countries. Sanction regimes adopted unilaterally by regional organizations, such as the EU or the League of Arab States, were allocated to their member organizations.
Finally, the sixth indicator relates to each country’s “Contribution to the UN budget and international solidarity”. Articles 17 and 19 of the UN Charter cover financial and budgetary arrangements of the UN. Under Article 19, “a Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years.” The UN Fifth Committee maintains a list of countries subject to the provisions of Article 19, all of which are assigned a value of 0 on this indicator in the UN-Mi, while other countries are given a value of 100. As of February 2024, these countries were: Afghanistan, Comoros, Dominica, Ecuador, Liberia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. For OECD/DAC and other countries with available data, this score is adjusted on the basis of their contribution to international solidarity, measured by the share of their GNI that is devoted to official development assistance (averaged over the period 2018–2022). Five OECD/DAC members achieved the 0.7% target (Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden). Box. 3.2 discusses and compares the evolution of expenditure on international solidarity and military expenditure since the adoption of the SDGs in 2015.
Figure 3.8 | Official Development Assistance (ODA) as share of GNI, OECD DAC members, 2018=2022
Note: Note: Countries listed in descending order of the average ratio ODA/GNI over the period 2018–2022. Internationally agreed target: 0.7%.
Source: OECD, 2023
Government efforts to implement the SDGs
Since 2018, the SDSN has mobilized its global network to track government efforts and commitments for the SDGs (including speeches, strategies, action plans, national indicator frameworks, consultations, and the integration of the SDGs in national budgets). Using the Six Transformations Framework, we produce sectoral policy scorecards to track the evolution of investment and legislative frameworks for each major transformation. We also evaluate the participation of countries in formal SDG review processes, notably the submission of Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs). The methodology and databases from past editions are available online (Lafortune, Woelm, and Valentiny 2022; Sachs et al. 2023).
Box 3.2. Are the member countries of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) more on track to achieving their targets on international solidarity or military expenditure?
In April 2024, the OECD/DAC updated its database on expenditure related to official development assistance (OECD 2024). The same month, the Stockholm International Peace Institute updated its military expenditure database (SIPRI 2024).
Figure 3.9 and 3.10 compare the evolution of spending on ODA and military focusing on the 31 individual OECD/DAC member countries (excluding the EU as a bloc). The ODA figure also excludes in-donor refugee costs; expenditures happening inside donor countries to cover the first-year costs of sustaining developing country refugees arriving in their country which can be reported as ODA. In their recent statement, the DAC Civil Society Reference Group (DAC/CSO RG) expressed concerns about the underlying trends reflected in the ODA figures, and in particular about how they believe donors are inflating their ODA figures via the payment of in-donor refugee costs which “constitutes a payment by donors to themselves” (DAC Civil Society Reference Group 2024).
Officially, the 32 OECD/DAC members (including the European Union) spent 223.7 billion USD on ODA in 2023 or 0.37% of their GNI (OECD, 2024). When excluding the EU and in-donor refugee costs, this falls to 183.8 billion USD. By contrast the same 31 OECD/DAC member countries spent more than 1402.2 billion USD (or 1.4 trillion) on military expenditure. Overall, OECD/DAC members spent seven times more on military expenditure than on ODA in 2023.
In 1970, the UN adopted a resolution calling on the most developed countries to dedicate 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI) to ODA. Via Agenda 2030 and the SDGs, countries recommitted to this target in 2015 (under SDG 17.2 – Implement all development assistance commitments). Since 2014, member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are expected to dedicate 2% of their GDP to military expenditure. Out of the 31 OECD/DAC members, 24 are formal members of NATO and 4 are NATO’s Asian-Pacific partners (AP4 – Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea).
The number of OECD/DAC members that had achieved the 0.7% of GNI ODA target dropped from four countries in 2015, the year that the SDGs were adopted, to three in 2023 when we exclude in-donor refugee costs (when in-donor refugee costs are included, however, five countries achieved the target in 2023 ). By contrast, the number of OECD/DAC members that reached their target on military expenditure almost doubled over the same period – rising from 6 of the 31 member countries in 2015 to 11 in 2023. In 2024, several additional NATO countries are also expected to reach their military expenditure targets.
Figure 3.9 | Total expenditure on ODA versus military expenditure in OECD/DAC members (31) since the adoption of the SDGs, 2015-2023, millions USD, constant 2021 prices
Figure 3.10 | Number of OECD/DAC members that achieved internationally agreed targets on international solidarity versus military expenditure since the adoption of the SDGs, 2015-2023
Note: Note: ODA excludes in-donor refugee costs. When including in-donor refugee costs, five countries achieved the internationally agreed target on ODA/ GNI in 2023: Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden. Covering all OECD DAC members except the European Union as a bloc.
Source: OECD/DAC and SIPRI, April 2024
Overall, in 2024, 190 out of the 193 UN member states will present a Voluntary National Review (VNR). This includes countries that are to present a VNR in July 2024, according to the list presented by ECOSOC (Ojeda 2023). Argentina, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Mexico, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uruguay, and the Arab Republic of Egypt have been particularly engaged in the VNR processes over the years and have each presented four VNRs. Two non-UN-members (the European Union and Palestine) have also submitted VNRs. By contrast, three countries have never taken part in the VNR process – Haiti, Myanmar, and the United States.
Increasingly, regional and local authorities are also preparing Voluntary Local Reviews (VLRs). Figure 3.12 summarizes the number of VLRs submitted by country. Recently, the OECD and SDSN surveyed more than 240 regional and local authorities and stakeholders and found that financing is the main barrier to implementing the SDGs at the subnational level (OECD and SDSN 2024). The SDSN Global Commission for Urban SDG Finance will release its final recommendation in July 2024 to address the specific challenges faced by local and regional authorities in financing the SDGs.2
Figure 3.11 | Participation in Voluntary National Review process (number of countries), 2016–2024
Note: Note: N=193.
Source: Authors, based on desk research and https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/vnrs/
Figure 3.12 | Number of Voluntary Local Reviews presented by country
Note: As of March 2024.
Source: Authors, based on desk research and https://sdgs.un.org/topics/voluntary-local-reviews.
Figure 3.13 | The 2024 UN-Mi versus number of VNRs submitted (2016-2024)
Source: Authors
The SDSN 2023 Survey of Government Efforts for the SDGs emphasized persisting discrepancy between expressed political support for the SDGs and integration of the goals into strategic public policy processes, especially long-term budget and investment framework. This is aligned with findings in the literature (Biermann et al. 2022; Kotzé et al. 2022; IGS 2023). Interestingly, the countries that perform well on the UN-Mi tend to also be those that engage more deeply with the SDGs. Figure 3.13 compares the UN-Mi total score and the number of VNRs presented for all 193 UN member states.
Outlook
Effective UN-based multilateralism is more important than ever before, because people and nations are more interconnected than ever before. No nation can solve the global climate crisis on its own. No nation can make a low-cost energy transition on its own. No nation can ensure peace and security on its own. No nation by itself can protect the vital ecosystems or avoid the potential dangers and pitfalls of runaway technologies, whether advanced biotechnologies that can create new pathogens, or artificial intelligence systems that can create fake news or provocations to war. Collectively, new funding mechanisms must be identified to channel the world’s global savings to sustainable development investments, based on countries’ needs and commitments to achieving the SDGs, and to safeguard the global commons (Rockström et al. 2024).
Nation-states, which remain at the heart of the multilateral system, must be held accountable for upholding the values and principles of the UN Charter and implementing the SDGs – the shared global vision for sustainable development. All countries, richer and poorer alike, should use the momentum of the upcoming international conferences and summits – including the Summit of the Future (2024), COP 29 in Azerbaïdjan (2024) and COP 30 in Brazil (2025), the UN World Social Summit (2025), and the fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in Spain (2025), among others – to recommit to strengthening UN-based multilateralism and global partnerships, as emphasized by SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals), and to accelerated actions for the SDGs.
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The Sustainable Development Report (formerly the SDG Index & Dashboards) is a global assessment of countries' progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. It is a complement to the official SDG indicators and the voluntary national reviews.
All data presented on this website are based on the publication Sachs, J.D., Lafortune, G., Fuller, G. (2024). The SDGs and the UN Summit of the Future. Sustainable Development Report 2024. Paris: SDSN, Dublin: Dublin University Press. 10.25546/108572
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